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Abstract
Partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be
negligibly small in order to be free from income eect but then the consumer does
not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense. In
the setting of a continuum of commodities, we propose a limiting procedure which
transforms the general many-commodity framework into a partial single-commodity
framework. In the limit, willingness to pay for a commodity is established as a
density notion and it is shown to be free from income eect. This pins down an exact
relationship between general equilibrium analysis and partial equilibrium analysis.
1 Introduction
Partial equilibrium analysis isolates the market of a particular commodity from the rest
of the economy and looks at changes there by assuming that \other things remain equal
(Marshall, Principle of Economics [6], p.207)." This presumes that there is no income eect
on the commodity under consideration, because otherwise change of consumption of it in
general changes expense on the other commodities and this in turn changes the consumer's
willingness to pay for it, meaning that the isolation fails and policy recommendation based
on such analysis is misleading.
The absence of income eect is usually justied by saying that the commodity is negli-
gibly small compared to the entire set of commodities. Then, however, the consumer does
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not care for it apparently and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense.
This is the dilemma we tackle in the current paper.
Vives [10] is the rst paper which provides a formal treatment of the above-noted
tension. He considers an increasing sequence of sets of commodities, and under certain
assumptions shows that income eect on each single commodity vanishes as the number of
commodity and income tend to innity at the same rate.
This approach, however, does not allow us to handle eventually (countably) innitely
many commodities, since (i) it assumes roughly that all commodities have the uniform
degree of utility weight, which cannot be true when there are indeed countably innitely
many commodities because if so the entire utility function cannot take a nite value; and (ii)
it assumes that income increases at the same rate as the number of commodities, which we
cannot think of literally in the limit. Thus, there is a discontinuity between the case of large
but nite numbers of commodities and the case of indeed innite number of commodities,
and the asymptotic property of a sequence of preferences over nitely many commodities
does not extend to be a property of preference that should make sense in the limit. To our
knowledge, there has been no study which pins down an exact relationship in the limit,
between preference in the general equilibrium setting and the notion of willingness to pay
in the partial equilibrium setting.
We provide a limiting procedure which resolves the above-noted dilemma and converts
the many-commodity general equilibrium framework into the partial equilibrium framework
in an exact and operational manner.
We take a reverse direction. We present the whole set of commodities in the outset,
which is a continuum, and subdivide it into many pieces so that each piece tends to be
arbitrarily small. The continuum assumption might look odd, but it applies not only to the
case of nely dierentiated commodities, but also to resource allocation under uncertainty
with a continuum of states and intertemporal resource allocation with continuous time.
Also, more importantly, it is a reasonable framework for precisely describing what we
mean by `negligible.'
Let us illustrate the dierence between the Vives approach and the present one. Vives
[10] considers a sequence of prices and incomes f(pn; wn)g, where pn is an n-dimensional
price vector, which is uniformly bounded from above and below, and income wn increases
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at the same rate as n. Then, for each n consumption vector zn 2 Rn++ must satisfy budget
constraint
nX
k=1
pnkz
n
k = w
n:
Then, for a dierential income change w we have
nX
k=1
pnk (z
n
k +z
n
k ) = w
n +w
which implies so-called the Engel aggregation condition
nX
k=1
pnk
@znk
@w
= 1:
Under suitable assumptions, the income derivative of demand
@znk
@w
uniformly converges
to zero at rate 1=n (see also Hayashi [4]). This is because given the price sequence fpng
to be uniformly bounded from above and below the sum of income derivatives
Pn
k=1
@znk
@w
is uniformly bounded from above and below as well and because every
@znk
@w
is shown to
have the same degree of magnitude.1 Notice here that income wn goes to innity at the
same rate as n, and asymptotically the consumer has a large pool of income so that income
change w is small compared to wn.
The present approach considers that the set of commodity characteristics is given as a
continuum, say the unit interval [0; 1]. Let  be the Lebesgue measure over [0; 1]. Then
a price system is given as a density function p : [0; 1] ! R++ with suitable mathematical
properties, and income w > 0 is given as a xed number.
We formulate the process of subdivision in the form an sequence of nite partitions
fJ ng of the set of commodity characteristics, which tends to be ner and ner for larger n
and converges to the nest partition of singletons. At each step of subdivision, we consider
that the consumer is given a nite number of commodities, namely, jJ nj commodities.
That is, given n, each K 2 J n is taken to be one commodity so that the consumption
amount is constant over K, denoted by znK let's say, and the price of subdivision K is given
by pnK =
R
K
p(t)d(t).
1This relies on an extra assumption that all commodities are normal. Without this assumption, however,
Vives [10] shows that the Euclidian norm of vector

@zn1
@w ;    ; @z
n
n
@w

vanishes at rate 1=
p
n.
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Then the budget constraint takes the formX
K2J n
pnKz
n
K = w
Let w be the income change then it satisesX
K2J n
pnK (z
n
K +z
n
K) = w +w;
which implies the corresponding version of Engel aggregation conditionX
K2J n
pnK
@znK
@w
= 1:
The budget constraint and the Engel aggregation condition are rewritten intoX
K2J n
pnK
(K)
znK(K) = w
and X
K2J n
pnK
(K)
 @z
n
K
@w
(K) = 1
respectively, where
pnK
(K)
is the average of prices of the elements of K.
Because dierentiation of integration a function is the original function itself, as we
make the subdivisions ner and ner the vector of average prices

pK
(K)

K2J n
converges to
the density p, and the budget constraint converges to the integral formZ 1
0
p(t)f(t)d(t) = w
where consumption bundle is given as a function f : [0; 1]! R++, and the Engel aggrega-
tion condition converges to its continuum versionZ 1
0
p(t)
@f(t)
@w
d(t) = 1:
Notice that income eect on each subdivision
@znK
@w
converges to the density on its element
t, a positive term @f(t)
@w
, and does not vanish. However, the income eect adjusted to its
smallness
@znK
@w
(K) is negligibly small as its limit is @f(t)
@w
d(t). This is because the income
change associated with having one extra unit of subdivision K is w (K) instead of w,
as its limit at commodity element t is w  d(t) instead of w.
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We invoke this point in order to found the notion of willingness to pay. The traditional
partial equilibrium analysis after Hicks [5] assumes quasi-linear preference over pairs of
consumption and income transfer. Let x denote the quantity of the commodity being
focused and a denote the associated income transfer which is either positive (when received)
or negative (when paid). The implicit idea behind is that the consumer already has a "large"
pool of income and cares only about its relative change described by a.
The analysis assumes that the consumer has so-called quasi-linear preference which is
represented in the form
u(x; a) = v(x) + a
or its monotone transformation. In typical application in which price of the commodity is
denoted by p, the income transfer is taken to be the payment, meaning a =  px, and the
whole expression is taken to be v(x)   px. Quasi-linearity implies that the marginal rate
of substitution of income transfer for the commodity, marginal willingness to pay for it in
other words, takes the form
S(x; a) = v0(x);
which is independent of a. This means there is no income eect on the commodity under
consideration. However, the quasi-linear preference form itself says nothing about why
there is no income eect.
We think that quasi-linearity should be derived as a limit property of preference in some
many-commodity general equilibrium setting. Following the Vives approach, Hayashi [4]
showed the following asymptotic quasi-linearity result. Given n commodities, consider that
one commodity, say j, is to be the object of partial equilibrium analysis and the remaining
n  1 commodities are to be aggregated, and let %n;j be the preference induced over pairs
of consumption of the commodity under analysis and income transfer to be allocated to
the other commodities. For (x; a); (y; b) 2 R++  ( wn;1), dene
(x; a) %n;j (y; b)
by
Un
 
x; zn;j(x; a)
  Un  y; zn;j(y; b) ;
5
where zn;j(x; a) 2 Rn 1++ is the solution to
max
z j2Rn 1++
Un (x; z j)
subject to
X
k 6=j
pnkzk = w
n + a
and similarly for zn;j(y; b).
Hayashi shows that %n;j is asymptotically quasi-linear in the sense that the derivative
of marginal rate of substitution with respect to a vanishes as n tends to innity. Notice
again that wn tends to innity, which means that income transfer a tends to be relatively
very small compared to it.
Now we illustrate the present approach. Let U be a representation of preference over
the entire consumption space with the continuum of commodity characteristics. Given n,
let Un be the restriction of U on to the nite dimensional subspace RjJ nj, dened by
Un(z) = U
 X
K2J n
zK1K
!
for z = (zK)K2J n 2 RjJ
nj
++ . Also, given n and J 2 J n to be xed, (x; z J) 2 RjJ nj denotes
the vector such that x is its J-component z J 2 RjJ nj 1 refers to the rest of the entries.
Given n, pick J 2 J n to be the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the approximate
sense. In the limit, the set J is supposed to shrink to a point. Let x be the consumption
amount which is constant over J . Let a be the amount of income transfer which is accom-
panied with the consumption of each element of J . Since the mass of the piece is (J),
the total income transfer which is accompanied with the consumption of the commodity
piece is a(J). Because income is xed to be nite here, this adjustment corresponds to
the nature that income transfer is relatively very small compared to the pool of income.
Thus, given n, J 2 J n, the preference relation induced over pairs of consumption and
income transfer, denoted %n;J , is dened by:
(x; a) %n;J (y; b)
hold for (x; a); (y; b) 2 R++ 

  w
(J)
;1

if and only if
Un
 
x; zn;J(x; a)
  Un  y; zn;J(y; b) ;
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Figure 1: Induced Preference
where zn;J(x; a) = (zn;JK (x; a))K2J nnfJg 2 RjJ
nj 1
++ is the solution to
max
z J2RjJ
nj 1
++
Un (x; z J)
subject to
X
K2J nnfJg
pKzK = w + a(J)
and similarly for zn;J(y; b).
See Figure 1 for how the induced preference typically looks like.
The paper shows that the sequence of induced 2-good preferences f%n;Jg converges and
the limit preference is quasi-linear, as is illustrated in Figure 2. This is a stronger result
in the sense that the previous one shows only that the corresponding sequence exhibits
asymptotic constancy of MRS with respect to income transfers but there may not be a
limit preference.
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Figure 2: Limit Preference
2 The quasi-linearity limit theorem: separable pref-
erences
For the presentation purpose, we limit our argument to the case of separable preferences.
More general arguments on non-separable preferences are provided in the appendix.
2.1 Consumption space
Let T = [t; t] be a nite interval,  be the family of Lebesgue measurable sets, and  be
the Lebesgue measure.
Let L1(T ) be the space of essentially bounded measurable functions from T to R, which
is endowed with the sup norm. Denote the norm dual of L1(T ) by L1(T ). It is known
that the norm dual of L1(T ) is the set of nitely additive signed measured over T endowed
with the total variation norm denoted by ba(T ), that is, L1(T ) = ba(T ).
Let L1(T ) be the space of Lebesgue integrable functions from T to R, which is endowed
with the integral norm. It is known that L1(T ) can be viewed as a subset of L1(T ) =
ba(T ). There the dual operation takes the form hp; fi = R
T
p(t)f(t)d(t), where f 2 L1(T )
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and p 2 L1(T ). Given an integrable function p : T ! R and a measurable set K 2 , let
pK =
R
K
p(t)d(t).
It is known that L1(T ) = L1(T ), with the dual operation given by hf; pi = R
T
f(t)p(t)d(t)
where f 2 L1(T ) and p 2 L1(T ).
Let L1+ (T ) be the set of essentially bounded measurable functions which are non-
negative almost everywhere. Dene L1+(T ) similarly. Also, let
L1++(T ) = ff 2 L1+ (T ) : a:e: t 2 T; f(t) > 0g
and
L1+++(T ) = ff 2 L1+ (T ) : 9l > 0; a:e: t 2 T; f(t)  lg:
and dene L1++(T ) and L
1
+++(T ) similarly.
We take L1+++(T ) to be the consumption space.
For simplicity, the process of subdivisions is described by a sequence of increasing par-
titions, denoted fJ ng, which is generated by the binary expansion as
J n =

t; t+
t  t
2n

;

t+
t  t
2n
; t+
2(t  t)
2n

;
   ;

t+
(2n   2)(t  t)
2n
; t+
(2n   1)(t  t)
2n

;

t+
(2n   1)(t  t)
2n
; t

for each n. Notice that for every t 2 T , there exists a unique sequence fJn(t)g such that
Jn(t) 2 J n and t 2 Jn(t) for all n and lim inf Jn(t) = lim sup Jn(t) = t.
2.2 Assumptions
Separable Preference: Preference over L1+++(T ) is represented by a function U which
has the form
U(f) =
Z
T
v(f(t); t)d(t);
for f 2 L1+++(T ), with the following properties:
1. For almost all t 2 T , v(; t) : R++ ! R is a C2 function, and for all z 2 R++,
@v(z;)
@z
: T ! R and @2v(z;)
@z2
: T ! R are Lebesgue measurable.
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2. There exist non-increasing functions ;  from R++ to R++ such that
(i) (y)  (y) for all y 2 R++;
(ii) (y)!1 as y ! 0 and (y)! 0 as y !1; and
(iii) for all z 2 R++ and almost every t 2 T ,
(z)  @v(z; t)
@z
 (z):
3. For any xed z; z > 0, there exist  <  < 0 such that
 5 @
2v(z; t)
@z2
5 
for all z 2 [z; z] and almost all t 2 T .
Wealth and Prices: (i) w > 0;
(ii) p 2 L1+++(T ) and there exist p; p with 0 < p < p such that p(t) 2 [p; p] for almost
all t 2 T .
2.3 Induced 2-good preference
Given n, pick J 2 J n to be the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the approximate
sense. Now consider the preference induced over pairs of the quantity of commodity piece
J and associated income transfer, which is determined by aggregating the other commodity
pieces in the Hicksian manner.2
2One might think of establishing the preference induced over the two commodity groups, J and T nJ , by
working directly on a continuum rather than by going through nite subdivisions as above. For example,
given any interval piece J  T , one may consider Hicksian aggregation over the complement T n J by
solving the problem
max
f J2L1+++(TnJ)
U (x1I ; f J )
subject to hp J ; f J i = w + a(J);
and then making J arbitrarily small. However, on innite-dimensional vector spaces like L1(T ) or L1(T n
J), it is unclear if the demand analysis with dierential comparative statics as we do here can work,
where we also need to vary J . Therefore we start with taking nite subdivisions of the set of commodity
characteristics, and make it arbitrarily ner in order to obtain the limit preference. This is somewhat
parallel to the strategy taken by Bewley [1].
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Given n, the restriction of U onto the nite-dimensional subspace RjJ nj, denoted Un :
RjJ
nj
++ ! R, is dened by
Un(z) = U
 X
K2J n
zK1K
!
for z = (zK)K2J n 2 RjJ
nj
++ . Also, given n and J 2 J n to be xed, (x; z J) 2 RjJ nj denotes
the vector such that x is its J-component and z J 2 RjJ nj 1 refers to the rest.
Denition 1 Given n, J 2 J n and (x; a); (y; b) 2 R++ 

  w
(J)
;1

, the relation
(x; a) %n;J (y; b)
holds if
Un
 
x; zn;J(x; a)
  Un  y; zn;J(y; b) ;
where zn;J(x; a) = (zn;JK (x; a))K2J nnfJg 2 RjJ
nj 1
++ and z
n;J(y; b) = (zn;JK (y; b))K2J nnfJg 2
RjJ
nj 1
++ are solutions to
max
z J2RjJ
nj 1
++
Un (x; z J)
subject to
X
K2J nnfJg
pKzK = w + a(J)
and
max
z J2RjJ
nj 1
++
Un (y; z J)
subject to
X
K2J nnfJg
pKzK = w + b(J)
respectively.
Under separable preference, the Hicksian aggregation problem reduces to
max
z J2RjJ
nj 1
++
8<:
Z
J
v(x; t)d(t) +
X
K2KnnfJg
Z
K
v(zK ; t)(t)
9=;
subject to
X
K2J nnfJg
pKzK = w + a(J);
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and the conditional demand is independent of x. Thus denote the solution by zn;J(a) =
(zn;JK (a))K2J nnfJg, and let us call it conditional demand.
Under the current assumption the nite dimensional problem above has a unique interior
solution (see Debreu [3]) and with the Lagrange multiplier n;J(a) > 0 we have the rst
order condition
@
@zK
Z
K
v(zK ; t)d(t) = 
n;J(a)pK
for each K 2 J n n fJg.
By dierentiating the budget equation by a, we obtain the Engel aggregation conditionX
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (a)
@a
= (J):
Now let
V n;J(x; a) =
Z
J
v(x; t)d(t) +
X
K2J nnfJg
Z
K
v(zn;JK (a); t)(t)
be the indirect utility function given by the conditionally optimal consumption. Then we
have
@V n;J(x; a)
@x
=
@
@x
Z
J
v(x; t)d(t)
=
Z
J
@
@x
v(x; t)d(t)
and
@V n;J(x; a)
@a
=
X
K2J nnfJg
@
@zK
Z
K
v(zK ; t)d(t)
@zn;JK (a)
@a
= n;J(a)
X
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (a)
@a
= n;J(a)(J)
Therefore the marginal rate of substitution of income transfer for the commodity piece
J at (x; a) 2 R++ 

  w
(J)
;1

is given by
Sn;J(x; a) =
@V n;J(x; a)
@x

@V n;J(x; a)
@a
=
1
n;J(a)

R
J
@
@x
v(x; t)d(t)
(J)
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2.4 The limit theorem
Let  2 T be the object of the partial equilibrium analysis. Recall that there exists a
unique sequence fJn()g such that Jn() 2 J n and t 2 Jn() for all n and lim inf Jn() =
lim sup Jn() =  .
Here is the limit theorem.
Theorem 1 Given almost every  2 T and any compact set C  R++ R, there exists a
subsequence of fng, denoted fk(n)g, such that
sup
(x;a)2C
Sk(n);Jk(n)()(x; a)  S (x)! 0
where
S (x) =
1

 @
@x
v(x; )
and  is the Lagrange multiplier to the problem
max
f2L1+++(T )
U(f)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = w:
Proof. Fix any  2 T as the object of partial equilibrium analysis in the limit. Take the
sequence of intervals which contains  , and denote it by fJn()g.
As n ! 1, Jn() converges to fg. Then, from the fundamental theorem of calculus
we have R
Jn()
@
@x
v(x; t)d(t)
(Jn())
 ! @
@x
v(x; );
which is a uniform convergence on compacta under the current assumption.
Under the current assumptions we can apply Lemma 8 in the appendix, which delivers
that the sequence fn;Jn()(a)g has a subsequence which converges uniformly to a constant
, which is the Lagrange multiplier for the problem
max
f
Z
T
v(f(t); t)(t)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = w:
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Thus, the limit of marginal rate of substitution for the sequence of induced 2-good
preferences, S (x), is understood to be the marginal willingness to pay for commodity 
when the consumer is given x units of it.
Let % be the preference relation over R++  R which corresponds to the limit. Then
by integrating the above marginal rate of substitution formula in the limit we can represent
it by
(x; a) % (y; b) () v(x; )

+ a  v(y; )

+ b:
Here is an example of closed-form solution.
Example 1 Consider that a consumer has CES preference, which is represented byZ
T
(t)
f(t)1 
1   d(t);
where f(t) denotes the consumption of commodity t 2 T , (t) denotes the weight on it,
and  > 0 denotes the coecient of elasticity of substitution.
Then the marginal willingness to pay for commodity  2 T when she is given x units
of it has the form
S (x) =
()R
T
(t)
1
p(t)1 
1
d(t)
  w
x
;
and by integrating this back we can represent % in the form
()R
T
(t)
1
p(t)1 
1
d(t)
wx1  + a:
2.5 General equilibrium and partial equilibrium
The current approach allows us to characterize an exact relationship between general equi-
librium and partial equilibrium. To emphasize that willingness to pay depends on the price
system and income at the general equilibrium level, denote consumer i's marginal willing-
ness to pay for an extra one unit of commodity  2 T when she is consuming x units of it
by Si; (x; p; wi), which is given by
Si; (x; p; wi) =
1
i(p; wi)
 @
@x
vi(x; );
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where i(p; wi) is the Lagrange multiplier to the problem
max
f
Z
T
vi(f(t); t)d(t)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = wi:
To illustrate, consider a pure exchange economy in which consumers' initial endowments
are given by !i 2 L1+++(T ), i = 1;    ; n. Then the following proposition is immediate from
the rst-order condition.
Proposition 1 Maintain the previous assumptions. Then, an interior allocation (f i)i=1; ;m
constitutes competitive general equilibrium under price system p and if and only if for al-
most all  2 T , (f i())i=1; ;m satises
Si; (f i(); p; hp; !ii) = p()
for every i = 1;    ;m.
This also implies that competitive equilibrium allocation is viewed as the solution to
an unconstrained maximization problem for the sum of the integrals of consumers' surplus
across commodities.
Proposition 2 Maintain the previous assumptions. Then, an interior allocation (f i)i=1; ;m
constitutes competitive general equilibrium under price system p if and only if it is a solu-
tion to
max
g1; ;gm
mX
i=1
Z
T
(Z gi(t)
0
Si;t(x; p; hp; !ii)dx  p(t)gi(t)
)
d(t):
Note that the above maximization problem is equivalent to
max
g1; ;gm
mX
i=1
1
i(p; hp; !ii)
Z
T
vi(gi(t); t)d(t) 
mX
i=1
Z
T
p(t)gi(t)d(t);
where the rst term is so-called Negishi's social welfare function in which welfare weights
are endogenously determined as the inverse of marginal utilities of income (Negishi [8]).
These two are in general dierent for non-separable preferences, however, because one's
willingness to pay for a particular commodity depends implicitly on her entire consumption
prole in general equilibrium as well as the price system and her income (see appendix for
details).
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3 Concluding remarks
We conclude by presenting possible future directions of the research. First thing is whether
the convergence result holds with some uniformity across commodities. Second is how fast
or slow the convergence is. Thirdly, we have assumed in the current paper that the market
is complete, in particular that all the commodities are marketable, and we wonder what is
the right way to obtain a notion of willingness to pay when the overall market is incomplete.
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A Appendix: General non-separable case
A.1 Mathematical preliminaries
Let T = [t; t] be a nite interval,  be the family of Lebesgue measurable sets, and  be
the Lebesgue measure.
Let L1(T ) be the space of essentially bounded measurable functions from T to R, which
is endowed with the sup norm. Denote the norm dual of L1(T ) by L1(T ). It is known
that the norm dual of L1(T ) is the set of nitely additive signed measured over T endowed
with the total variation norm, which is denoted by ba(T ). Thus, L1(T ) = ba(T ).
Let L1(T ) be the space of Lebesgue integrable functions from T to R, which is endowed
with the integral norm. It is known that L1(T ) can be viewed as a subset of L1(T ) =
ba(T ). There the dual operation takes the form hp; fi = R
T
p(t)f(t)d(t), where f 2 L1(T )
and p 2 L1(T ). Given an integrable function p : T ! R and a measurable set K 2 , let
pK =
R
K
p(t)d(t).
It is known that L1(T ) = L1(T ), with the dual operation given by hf; pi = R
T
f(t)p(t)d(t)
where f 2 L1(T ) and p 2 L1(T ). Hence one can consider weak convergence in L1(T ) and
weak- convergence in L1(T ). Say that a sequence in L1(T ), denoted fpg, weakly con-
verges to p if
hf; pi ! hf; pi
for all f 2 L1(T ). Say that a sequence in L1(T ), denoted ff g, weak- converges to f if
hf  ; pi ! hf; pi
for all p 2 L1(T ).
Let C  Rm be a compact set and consider a sequence of functions from C to L1(T ),
denoted by fpg. Say that fpg weakly converges to p, a function from C to L1(T ),
uniformly on C if
sup
s2C
jhf; p(s)  p(s)ij ! 0
for all f 2 L1(T ). Also, consider a sequence of functions from C to L1(T ), denoted by
ff g. Then say that ff g weak- converges to f , a function from C to L1(T ), uniformly
on C if
sup
s2C
jhf (s)  f(s); pij ! 0
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for all p 2 L1(T ).
We have three mathematical claims. First follows from the sequential Banach-Alaoglu
theorem, since L1(T ) is separable.
Lemma 1 [z1; z1] is weak- sequentially compact.
Second is about denseness of J n-measurable simple functions.
Lemma 2 The subspace of J n-measurable simple functions is weak- dense in L1+++(T ).
Third is a generalization of the Ascoli-Arzela theorem.
Lemma 3 Let C be a compact metric space. Let ff g be a sequence of functions from C
to L1(T ). Suppose
(i) there exists a weak- sequentially compact subset G  L1(T ) such that f (s) 2 G for
all  and s 2 C;
(ii) for all q 2 L1(T ), for all " > 0, there is  > 0 such that for all  and s; s0 2 C,
d(s; s0) <  =) jhf (s); qi   hf (s0); qij < ":
Then there exists a subsequence ffk()g and a f function from C to L1(T ) such that for
all q 2 L1(T ),
sup
s2C
jhfk()(s); qi   hf(s); qij ! 0 as  !1;
where f is continuous in the sense that f(sl) weak- converges to f(s) as sl ! s.
Proof. Given s 2 C and a natural number m, let Bm(s) = fs0 : d(s; s0) < 1=mg. Since
C  Ss2S Bm(s) and C is compact, the family of open balls fBm(s)gs2C has a nite
subfamily which covers C. Let Cm be the set of center of the open balls which form the
nite subcovers. Now let Cd =
S1
m=1Cm, which is a countable dense subset of C. Let C
d
be presented in the form Cd = fs1; s2;    g.
For s1, ff (s1)g is a sequence in [z1; z1], hence has a weak- convergent subsequence.
Denote the convergent subsequence by ff 1;(s1)g. Denote the corresponding subsequence
of ff g by ff 1;g.
Next, consider ff 1;(s2)g. It is a sequence in [z1; z1], hence has a weak- convergent
subsequence. Denote the convergent subsequence by ff 2;(s2)g. Denote the corresponding
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subsequence of ff 1;g by ff 2;g. Note that both f 2;(s1) and f 2;(s2) are convergent in the
weak- sense.
Now follow the diagonal argument, and let ff ;g be the diagonal sequence that weak-
converges at each point of Cd. Rewrite it by fgg.
Pick any q 2 L1(T ) and " > 0. By the equicontinuity condition, there is  > 0 such
that for all d(s; s0) <  implies jhg(s); qi   hg(s0); qij < "=3 for all s; s0 2 C and for all .
Let M > 1= and CM be the nite subset of C
d as constructed in the previous step
where m = M , which is -dense in C. Since fgng converges at each point of CM in the
weak- sense, there is N such that
;  0 > N =) jhg(s); qi   hg0(s); qij < "=3; 8s 2 CM
Pick any s 2 C. Then there exists s0 2 CM such that d(s; s0) < , hence for all
;  0 > maxfN;Mg,
jhg(s); qi   hg0(s); qij 5 jhg(s); qi   hg(s0); qij
+jhg(s0); qi   hg0(s0); qij
+jhg0(s0); qi   hg0(s); qij
< "=3 + "=3 + "=3 = "
Since q is arbitrary, fg(s)g is a weak- Cauchy sequence when s 2 C is xed. Hence
fg(s)g weak- converges. Denote the limit by f(s). Since [z1; z1] is weak- compact, we
have f(s) 2 [z1; z1].
To show that the convergence is uniform, note that we already have
lim
;0!1
sup
s2C
jhg(s); qi   hg0(s); qij = 0:
Now let  0 !1 while  is xed, then we have
lim
!1
sup
s2C
jhg(s); qi   hf(s); qij = 0:
Since q is arbitrary, we have the uniform weak- convergence.
To show that f is continuous in the above-noted sense, pick any q 2 L1(T ). Then the
result follows from
jhf(sl); qi   hf(s); qij 5 jhf(sl); qi   hf (sl); qij
+jhf (sl); qi   hf (s); qij
+jhf (s); qi   hf(s); qij:
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A.2 Basic assumptions
Let U : L1+++(T )! R be a representation of the preference. Here we list the basic assump-
tions on the representation U . The assumptions below involve some cardinal information
about the representation. One may write them down in terms of marginal rate of substitu-
tion as is done in Hayashi [4]. However, for simplicity of the argument we take the current
description.
Regular Preference:
(i) U : L1+++(T ) ! R is norm-continuous and Frechet dierentiable. Moreover,
DU(f) 2 L1+++(T ) for all f 2 L1+++(T ), and the mapping DU() : L1+++(T )! L1(T )
is continuous in the following sense: given any compact set C  Rm, for any sequence
of functions from C to L1+++(T ), denoted by ff g, and a function from C to L1+++(T )
denoted by f , if ff g weak- converges to f uniformly on C then DU(f ) weakly
converges to DU(f) uniformly on C.
(ii) U : L1+++(T )! R is strictly quasi-concave.
Under rst-order dierentiability and quasi-concavity, the following claim holds.
Lemma 4 For all f; g 2 L1+++(T ),
U(g) = U(f) =) hDU(f); g   fi = 0
and
U(g) > U(f) =) hDU(f); g   fi > 0:
Proof. To show the rst part, suppose U(g) = U(f). Then by quasi-concavity we have
U(f + (g   f))  U(f)

= 0
for all  2 (0; 1). As ! 0, the rst-order dierentiability assures that the left-hand-side
converges to hDU(f); g   fi, which is non-negative in the limit.
To show the second part, suppose U(g) > U(f) and hDU(f); g fi 5 0. Since DU(f) 6= 0,
by norm continuity of U and the linear operator DU(f) one can take h 2 L1+++(T ) so that
U(h) > U(f) and hDU(f); h  fi < 0, which is a contradiction to the previous part.
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We make some assumptions about the preference induced on the nite dimensional
subspaces generated by fJ ng.
Regular Preference on Finite Dimensions:
(i) For all n, the restriction of U onto the nite-dimensional subspace RjJ nj, denoted
Un : RjJ
nj
++ ! R, which is dened by
Un(z) = U
 X
K2J n
zK1K
!
for z = (zK)K2J n 2 RjJ
nj
++ , is twice continuously dierentiable.
(ii) Denote the rst derivative of Un by DUn. Then,
DUn(z) 2 RjJ nj++
for all z 2 RjJ nj++ .
(iii) Denote the second derivative of Un by D2Un. Then, for all z 2 RjJ nj++ , the
(jJ nj+ 1) (jJ nj+ 1) matrix
Hn(z) =
 
D2Un(z) DUn(z)t
DUn(z) 0
!
is invertible.
We assume that the Inada-type condition holds in the uniform manner across n, which
is parallel to what Vives [10] assumes for increasing numbers of commodities.
Uniform Inada Property: There exist non-increasing functions ;  from R++ to R++
such that
(i) (y)  (y) for all y 2 R++;
(ii) (y)!1 as y ! 0 and (y)! 0 as y !1;
(iii) for all n, z = (zK)K2Jn 2 RjJ
nj
++ and K 2 J n,
(zK)  @U
n(z)
@zK

(K)  (zK):
The last basic assumption is about prices and the base income level.
Wealth and Prices: (i) w > 0;
(ii) p 2 L1+++(T ) and there exist p; p with 0 < p < p such that p(t) 2 [p; p] for almost
all t 2 T .
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A.3 Induced 2-good preference
Fix n and J 2 J n, and consider the maximization problem
max
z J2RjJ
nj 1
++
Un (x; z J)
subject to
X
K2J nnfJg
pKzK = w + a(J)
From the assumptions made on the nite-dimensional subspaces, the above maximiza-
tion problem has a unique solution in the interior (see Debreu [3], Mas-Colell [7]). Hence
we can resort to the rst order condition: there exists n;J > 0 such that
@
@zK
Un (x; z J) = n;JpK
for all K 2 J n n fJg, where pK =
R
K
p(t)d(t). From the second-order dierentiability as-
sumption, the solution, denoted zn;J(x; a) = (zn;JK (x; a))K2J nnfJg, is dierentiable in (x; a).
Also, we have the corresponding Lagrange multiplier as a dierentiable function of (x; a),
hence we denote it by n;J(x; a).
By dierentiating the budget equation by x, we have
X
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (x; a)
@x
= 0:
By dierentiating the budget equation by a, we have
X
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (x; a)
@a
= (J):
Now let
V n;J(x; a) = Un
 
x; zn;J(x; a)

be the indirect utility function given by the conditional optimal consumption. Then we
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have
@V n;J(x; a)
@x
=
@
@x
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
+
X
K2J nnfJg
@
@zK
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
@zn;JK (x; a)
@x
=
@
@x
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
+ n;J(x; a)
X
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (x; a)
@x
=
@
@x
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
and
@V n;J(x; a)
@a
=
X
K2J nnfJg
@
@zK
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
@zn;JK (x; a)
@a
= n;J(x; a)
X
K2J nnfJg
pK
@zn;JK (x; a)
@a
= n;J(x; a)(J)
Thus we obtain the characterization of the induced preference.
Proposition 3 Given n, the marginal rate of substitution of income transfer for the neigh-
boring good J 2 J n, at (x; a) 2 R++ 

  w
(J)
;1

, takes the form
Sn;J(x; a) =
@V n;J(x; a)
@x

@V n;J(x; a)
@a
=
1
n;J(x; a)

@
@x
Un (x; z J)

z J=zn;J (x;a)
(J)
:
A.4 Behavior of the conditional demand
First we show that the conditional demand choice is uniformly bounded from above and
away from zero.
Lemma 5 There exist z; z with 0 < z < z and ;  with 0 <  < , such that
zn;JK (x; a) 2 [z; z]
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n;J(x; a) 2 [; ]
for all n, (x; a) 2 C and J 2 J n, K 2 J n n fJg.
Proof. First we show the uniform boundedness from above. Suppose not. Then without
loss of generality there is f(xn; an); Jn; Kng such that
zn;J
n
Kn (x
n; an)!1:
Then we have
@
@zKn
Un (xn; z Jn)

(Kn)  

zn;J
n
Kn (x
n; an)

By the assumed property of , we have 

zn;J
n
Kn (x
n; an)

! 0.
Since
@
@zKn
Un (xn; z Jn)

(Kn) = n;J
n
(xn; an)
pKn
(Kn)
 n;Jn(xn; an)p;
from the rst-order condition, we have n;J
n
(xn; an)! 0.
On the other hand, also from the rst order condition, we have
max
K2J nnfJng
@
@zK
Un (xn; z Jn)

(K) = n;J
n
(xn; an) max
K2J nnfJng
pK
(K)
 n;Jn(xn; an)p;
hence the left hand side converges to zero.
From the uniform Inada condition again, we have
max
K2J nnfJng
@
@zK
Un (xn; z Jn)

(K)  max
K2J nnfJng


zn;J
n
K (x
n; an)

= 

min
K2J nnfJng
zn;J
n
K (x
n; an)

:
From the assumed property of , we have minK2J nnfJng zJ
n
K (x
n; an)!1.
However, since
w + an(Jn) =
X
K2J nnfJng
pKz
n;Jn
K (x
n; an)  p(T ) min
K2J nnfJng
zn;J
n
K (x
n; an);
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we have
min
K2J nnfJng
zn;J
n
K (x
n; an)  w + a
n(Jn)
p(T )
 w +max(x;a)2C jaj(T )
p(T )
;
which is a contradiction to the previous claim.
Uniform boundedness away from zero can be shown similarly. Since consumption is
uniformly bounded from above and below, the corresponding Lagrangean multipliers are
also bounded from above and away from zero.
Next we derive comparative statics properties of the conditional demand. From the
second-order argument, we have 
D2 JU
n(x; z J) D JUn(x; z J)t
D JUn(x; z J) 0
! 
dzt J
d
!
=
 
DJD JUn(x; z J)t 0t
0 (J)
! 
dx
da
!
;
where DJ refers to the derivative with regard to zJ and D J refers to the derivative with
regard to z J .
Given n and J 2 J n, let Hn;J(z) be the jJ nj  jJ nj matrix obtained by deleting the
J-row and the J-column of Hn(z). That is,
Hn;J(z) =
 
D2 JU
n(z) D JUn(z)t
D JUn(z) 0
!
:
For each K 2 J n n fJg, let Hn;JK (z) be the matrix obtained by replacing the K-column
of Hn;J(z) by (DJD JUn(z); 0)t. Also, for each K 2 J n n fJg, let eHn;JK (z) be the matrix
obtained by replacing the K-column of Hn;J(z) by (0; (J))t.
Then, by Cramer's rule we have
dzK
dx
=
Hn;JK (x; z J)
jHn;J(x; z J)j :
and
dzK
da
=
 eHn;JK (x; z J)
jHn;J(x; z J)j
for each n, J 2 J n and K 2 J n n fJg. Thus we can characterize the sensitivity of
conditional demand by means of the dierential properties of the preference.
Here we assume that the sensitivity terms given above are uniformly bounded as the
consumption vectors are uniformly bounded.
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Uniform Boundedness of Sensitivity: For any xed z; z > 0, there exist ;  and ; 
such that
 5
Hn;JK (z)
jHn;J(z)j 5 
and
 5
 eHn;JK (z)
jHn;J(z)j 5 
for all n, z 2 [z; z]J n and J;K 2 In.
Remark 1 When the preference is additively separable we have
jHn;JK (z)j
jHn;J (z)j = 0 for all n, z 2
[z; z]J
n
and J;K 2 In, hence the rst assertion of the assumption is met in a straightforward
manner.
Here we are assuming the condition which just makes income eects uniformly bounded,
and not assuming that the income eect on each commodity piece vanishes, though it turns
out to be true eventually.
Also note that the above conditions are stated directly as a property of the preference,
the primitive, not as a property of the derived conditional demand function.
A.5 The limit theorem
Now consider making the subdivision ner and ner. We show that the induced 2-good
preference converges to a quasi-linear preference (see Figure 2).
Hereafter, x  2 T arbitrarily and let J = Jn() for each n, and x a compact set
C  R++R. Also, for all suciently large n's, let ffn;Jn()g be the sequence of functions
from C to [z1; z1]  L1+++(T ) given by
fn;J
n()(x; a) = x1Jn() +
X
K2J nnfJn()g
z
n;Jn()
K (x; a)1K
for each n and (x; a) 2 C.
Lemma 6 For all q 2 L1(T ), for all " > 0, there is  > 0 such that for all n and
(x; a); (y; b) 2 C,
d((x; a); (y; b)) <  =) jhfn;Jn()(x; a); qi   hfn;Jn()(y; b); qij < ":
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Proof. Note that for any (x; a); (y; b) 2 C,
hfn;Jn()(x; a); qi hfn;Jn()(y; b); qi = (x y)qJn()+
X
K2J nnfJn()g

z
n;Jn()
K (x; a)  zn;J
n()
K (y; b)

qK :
Hence the proof is done if it is shown that for all " > 0 there is  > 0 such that
d((x; a); (y; b)) <  implies
zn;Jn()K (x; a)  zn;Jn()K (y; b) < " for all n andK 2 J nnfJn()g.
By the mean value theorem,
z
n;Jn()
K (x; a)  zn;J
n()
K (y; b) =
 
z
n;Jn()
K (v; e)
@v
;
z
n;Jn()
K (v; e)
@e
! 
x  y
a  b
!
for some (v; e) between (x; a) and (y; b). By the Uniform Boundedness of Sensitivity
assumption,
z
n;Jn()
K (v;e)
@v
and
z
n;Jn()
K (v;e)
@e
are uniformly bounded. This delivers the equi-
continuity property.
Lemma 7 The sequence ffn;Jn()g has a convergent subsequence ffk(n);Jk(n)()g with the
limit f 2 [z1; z1] which is constant over (x; a), in the sense that
sup
(x;a)2C
jhfk(n);Jk(n)()(x; a); qi   hf; qij ! 0
for all q 2 L1(T ).
Moreover, f is the unique solution to the problem (we call it unconditional problem)
max
f2L1+++(T )
U(f)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = w:
Proof. From the equi-continuity property, ffn;Jn()g has a subsequence ffk(n);Jk(n)()g
which weak- converges uniformly on C. Denote its limit by f  , then for all (x; a) 2 C, we
have f  (x; a) 2 [z1; z1]  L1+++(T ).
Then it is easy to see that the corresponding subsequence of
nP
K2J nnfJn()g z
n;Jn()
K (x; a)1K
o
also weak- converges to f  (x; a) uniformly on K.
Since * X
K2J nnfJn()g
z
n;Jn()
K (x; a)1K ; p
+
=
X
K2J nnfJn()g
pJz
n;Jn()
K (x; a)1K
= w + a(Jn())
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for all n, the uniform weak- convergence of the corresponding subsequence implies hf  (x; a); pi =
w for all (x; a) 2 C.
Fix any (x; a) 2 C. We show that f  (x; a) is a solution to the unconditional problem.
Suppose not. Then there exists g 2 L1+++(T ) with hp; gi = w such that U(g) > U(f  (x; a)).
Since the uniform weak- convergence implies pointwise weak- convergence, one can ndeU with U(g) > eU > U(f) such that eU > U  fn;Jn()(x; a) for all suciently large n.
Since the subspace of J n-measurable simple functions is weak- dense, one can nd
suciently large n and x1Jn()+
P
K2J nnfJn()g zK1K so that it satises the corresponding
budget constraint and its value is larger than eU . However, it contradicts to the optimality
given n.
From strict quasi-concavity, the unconditional problem has at most one solution. There-
fore, f  (x; a) is constant over (x; a) and  , hence rewrite it by f .
Lemma 8 The corresponding subsequence of fn;Jn()(x; a)g converges to  > 0 uniformly
on C, which is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the solution f given above.
Proof. Pick any K 2 J r n fJr()g for some xed r. From the rst-order condition we
have
n;J
n()(x; a) =
R
T
DU(fn;J
n()(x; a))(t)1Kd(t)R
K
p(t)d(t)
for all n = r.
As the subsequence ffk(n);Jk(n)()g uniformly weak- converges to f , from the Regular
Preference assumption the sequence fDU(fk(n);Jk(n)()(x; a))g uniformly weakly converges
to DU(f). Therefore the right-hand-side uniformly converges to
R
T DU(f)(t)1Kd(t)R
K p(t)d(t)
. Since
the limit of the right-hand-side is independent of (x; a) and  , so is the limit of the left-
hand-side. Thus, let  be the uniform limit of n;J
k(n)(), which is constant over (x; a).
Summing up, we have
 =
R
T
DU(f )(t)1Kd(t)R
K
p(t)d(t)
Since this is true for arbitrary K 2 J r n fJr()g and r, by picking almost any  6= 
and letting J = Jk(n)(), from the Lebesgue dierentiation theorem we have
 = lim
n!1
R
Jk(n)()
DU(f)(t)d(t)=(Jk(n)())R
Jk(n)()
p(t)d(t)=(Jk(n)())
=
DU(f)()
p()
Thus,  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to f . Since f is independent of  , so is
 and we rewrite it by .
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We make the following assumption with regard to the limit of shrinking neighborhoods.
Continuous Marginal Utility Density: For almost every  2 T , for any D  R++
and f 2 L1+++(T ), there exists U(x;  ; f) such that
sup
x2D
 @@xU  x1J + f1TnJ U(x;  ; f)(J)
 = o((J));
where J is any interval containing  with (J) > 0.
Moreover, U(x;  ; f) is continuous in f in the following sense: Given any compact
set C  Rm, if a sequence of functions from C to L+++(T ), denoted ff g, weak-
converges to f uniformly on C, then
sup
s2C
sup
x2D
jU(x;  ; f (s)) U(x;  ; f(s))j ! 0:
Remark 2 In the additive separable case, this is nothing but the result of the Lebesgue
dierentiation theorem which is applied to the function @v(x;)
@x
: T ! R.
Here we state the main result.
Theorem 2 Given almost every  2 T and any compact set C  R++ R, there exists a
subsequence of fng, denoted fk(n)g, such that
sup
(x;a)2C
jSn;Jk(n)()(x; a)  S (x)j ! 0
where
S (x)  1

U(x;  ; f);
f is the unique solution to the problem
max
f2L1+++(T )
U(f)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = w
and  is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier.
29
Proof. From the assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density, we have
sup
(x;a)2C
 @@xU
 
x1Jk(n)() + f1TnJk(n)()

(Jk(n)())
 
@
@x
U

x1Jk(n)() +
P
K2J k(n)nfJk(n)()g zK1K

z=zn;J
k(n)()(x;a)
(Jk(n)())

5 sup
(x;a)2C
 @
@x
U
 
x1Jk(n)() + f1TnJk(n)()
 U(x; ; f)(Jk(n)())
(Jk(n)())
+
sup
(x;a)2C
U(x; ; f)(Jk(n)()) U(x; ; fk(n);Jk(n)()(x; a))(Jk(n)())
(Jk(n)())
+
sup
(x;a)2C

@
@x
U

x1Jk(n)() +
P
K2J k(n)nfJk(n)()g zK1K

z=zn;J
k(n)()(x;a)
(Jk(n)())
 U(x; ; f
k(n);Jk(n)()(x; a))(Jk(n)())
(Jk(n)())

= sup
(x;a)2C
U(x; ; f) U(x; ; fk(n);Jk(n)()(x; a))+ o((Jk(n)()))
(Jk(n)()))
where fk(n);J
k(n)()(x; a) = x1Jk(n)() +
P
K2J k(n)nfJk(n)()g z
n;Jk(n)()
K (x; a)1K .
Since fk(n);J
k(n)()(x; a) uniformly weak- converges to f , the right-hand-side uniformly
converges to zero, from the assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density.
Combining this with the fact that fn;Jk(n)()(x; a)g converges to  > 0 uniformly on C,
we obtain the desired result.
Let % be the preference relation over R++  R which corresponds to the limit. Then
by integrating the above marginal rate of substitution formula in the limit we can represent
it by
(x; a) % (y; b) () 1

Z x
0
U(z;  ; f)dz + a  1

Z y
0
U(z;  ; f)dz + b:
We provide some examples of how to calculate marginal utility density.
Example 2 Consider the weighted expected utility preference (Chew and MacCrimmon
[2]) represented in the form
U(f) =
R
T
v(f(t))d(t)R
T
w(f(t))d(t)
;
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where  is absolutely continuous with respect to .
By direct calculation, we have
@
@x
U
 
x1J + f1TnJ

(J)
=
(J)
(J)

v0(x)

w(x)(J) +
R
TnJ w(f(t))d(t)

 

v(x)(J) +
R
TnJ v(f(t))d(t)

w0(x)
w(x)(J) +
R
TnJ w(f(t))d(t)
2 :
Hence the marginal utility density of commodity  2 T at quantity x is
U(x;  ; f) =
d()
d()
 v
0(x)
R
w(f(t))d(t)  w0(x) R v(f(t))d(t)
(
R
w(f(t))d(t))2
Notice that in the expected utility case with w being a constant, say 1, it reduces to
d()
d()
v0(x).
Example 3 Let T = [0; T ]. Consider Uzawa preference (Uzawa [9]) represented in the
form
U(f) =
Z T
0
u(f(t))e 
R t
0 (f(s))dsdt:
By direct calculation, we have
@
@x
U
 
x1J + f1TnJ

(J)
= e 
R inf J
0 (f(s))ds

u0(x)  0(x)
Z T
sup J
u(f(t))e 
R t
sup J (f(s))dsdt

:
Hence the marginal utility density of commodity  2 T at quantity x is
U(x;  ; f) = e 
R 
0 (f(s))ds

u0(x)  0(x)
Z T

u(f(t))e 
R t
 (f(s))dsdt

:
Notice that in the additive case with  being a constant it reduces to e u0(x).
Here we provide one characterization of the marginal utility density, under an additional
assumption. Given a consumption vector f , the marginal utility density of commodity
 2 T at quantity f() is equal to the Frechet derivative, an integrable function from T to
R under our assumption, evaluated at  .
Proposition 4 Assume additionally that for all f 2 L1+++(T ) and almost all  2 T , and
J 2  with  2 I,
hDU(f()1J + f1TnJ);1Ji = hDU(f);1Ji+ o((J)):
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Then, for all f 2 L1+++(T ) and almost all  2 T ,
U(f();  ; f) = DU(f)():
Proof. From the derivative formula for a composite function, we have
@
@x
U
 
x1J + f1TnJ

x=f()
= hDU(f()1J + f1TnJ);1Ji
From the assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density we have
@
@x
U
 
x1J + f1TnJ

x=f()
= U(f();  ; f()1J + f1TnJ)(J) + o((J)):
Therefore,
U(f();  ; f()1J + f1TnJ) =
@
@x
U
 
x1J + f1TnJ

x=f()
(J)
+
o((J))
(J)
=
hDU(f()1J + f1TnJ);1Ji
(J)
+
o((J))
(J)
=
hDU(f);1Ji+ o((J))
(J)
+
o((J))
(J)
;
where the third line follows from the additional assumption.
As J converges to fg, f()1J + f1TnJ converges to f in the weak- topology. By the
assumption of Continuous Marginal Utility Density, U(f();  ; f()1J+f1TnJ) converges
to U(f();  ; f).
By the Lebesgue dierentiation theorem, the right-hand-side converges to DU(f)().
B Application: general equilibrium and partial equi-
librium
As an application of our approach, here we provide an exact relationship between general
equilibrium and partial equilibrium. To emphasize that willingness to pay depends on the
price system and income at the general equilibrium level, denote consumer i's marginal
willingness to pay for an extra one unit of commodity  2 T when she is consuming x units
of it by Si; (x; p; wi), which is given by
Si; (x; p; wi) =
1
i(p; wi)
U(x;  ; f i(p; wi));
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where f i(p; wi) is the solution to the problem
max
f2L1+++(T )
U i(f)
subject to
Z
T
p(t)f(t)d(t) = wi
and i(p; wi) is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier.
To illustrate, consider a pure exchange economy in which consumers' initial endowments
are given by !i 2 L1+++(T ), i = 1;    ; n.
Proposition 5 Maintain the previous assumptions, and also assume that for each i =
1    ;m, for almost all  2 T and every f 2 L1+++(T ), U i(x; ; f) is decreasing in x.
Then, an interior allocation (f i)i=1; ;m constitutes competitive general equilibrium un-
der price system p and if and only if for almost all  2 T , (f i())i=1; ;m satises
Si; (f i(); p; hp; !ii) = p()
for every i = 1;    ;m.
Proof. (=) part) The interior equilibrium condition tells that
DU i(f i)() = ip()
for all i = 1;    ;m and almost all  2 T , where i is the Lagrange multiplier for the
problem
max
g
U i(g)
subject to g 2 L1+++(T );
Z
T
p(t)g(t)d(t) = wi:
Pick almost any  2 T , then since U i(f i();  ; f i) = DU i(f i)() for each i, we have
U i(f i();  ; f i)
i
= p()
for each i.
((= part) Given p and (wi)i=1; ;m, suppose
U i(f i();  ; bf i)bi = p()
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for each i and almost all  2 T , where bf i is the interior solution to the problem
max
g
U i(g)
subject to g 2 L1+++(T );
Z
T
p(t)g(t)d(t) = wi
and i is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier.
The interior optimality condition for bf i is that
DU i( bf i)() = bip()
for almost all  2 T , hence we have
U i(f i();  ; bf i) = DU i( bf i)()
for almost all  2 T .
From the assumption made above, this implies f i() = bf i() for almost all  2 T and
f i is optimizing under the budget constraint.
This result also implies that competitive equilibrium allocation is viewed as the solution
to an unconstrained maximization problem for the integral of consumers' surplus across
commodities.
Proposition 6 Maintain the previous assumptions. Then, an interior allocation (f i)i=1; ;m
constitutes competitive general equilibrium under price system p if and only if it is a solu-
tion to
max
g1; ;gm
mX
i=1
Z
T
(Z gi(t)
0
Si;t(x; p; hp; !ii)dx  p(t)gi(t)
)
d(t):
The above maximization problem is equivalent to
max
g1; ;gm
mX
i=1
1
i(p; hp; !ii)
Z
T
Z gi(t)
0
U i(x;  ; f i)dxd(t) 
mX
i=1
Z
T
p(t)gi(t)d(t);
where the rst term is in general dierent from Negish's social welfare functions
Pm
i=1
1
i(p;hp;!ii)U
i(gi),
in contrast to the case of separable preferences, because the marginal utility density U i(x;  ; f i)
may depend on the entire consumption prole f i in general equilibrium.
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